

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 11-10-82
TO: SA/IA		
ROOM NO. 7060	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: J/DDI/NEHA		
ROOM NO. 6002	BUILDING	EX

FORM NO. 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8

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D/NESA 82-490
10 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert C. Ames [redacted]
Director, Near East/South Asia Analysis, DDI

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SUBJECT: Iranian Policy

REFERENCE: [redacted]

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1. Action Required. None, for your information only.

2. NIO/NESA's memo of 9 November 1982 [redacted] copy attached), begs a very important question and ends up with a bottom line -- that State's evolutionary theory apparently is valid -- that I find disturbing. The revolution in Iran is xenophobic, nationalistic and religious and says, in effect, pox on houses both East and West. The Soviets are not making much if any headway in improving ties with Iran. That is on the overt level. The Soviets gave it a try, but I don't believe they ever seriously thought they could reach more than a modus vivendi with revolutionary Iran. But the Soviets do have some things going for them which must be of concern and argue for doing something more than sitting by and letting events take their course.

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3. The Soviets have many assets in Iran, not the least of which is their large official and advisory presence (3,000). They also have many long term assets in their contacts among the communist groups in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan -- they once supported "democracies" there and we must presume they have reinfiltrated their "republican" agents. Furthermore, in the absence of an efficient local security service and a large Western presence, the Soviets have a free hand to go about establishing covert organizations that can play a key role in times of chaos. The Soviets do not need good overt relations, they are willing to let the Tudeh be the overt focus of Iranian intention. The point is that the Soviets must be quite pleased with events in Iran: the US is out, they have assets and a free hand, and are bulding up an organization that could play a disproportionately large role in a period of chaos.

4. Although I will not go into covert action activities that can be taken to counter the Soviet program, I do believe the USG must develop a policy that is more than benign neglect (State). I believe we must encourage Western states and Japan, which have good relations with Iran, to get back

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SUBJECT: Iranian Policy


into Iran to fill the vacuum left by the absence of the US and which is being exploited by the Soviets. The time has come for the allies to get together and formulate an action policy on Iran to take advantage of Iranian distrust of the Soviets and concern about Soviet activities in the region. Islamic states such as Pakistan and Turkey must also be included. Iranian ties with the West are still alive and must not be permitted to atrophy to the Soviet advantage.



Robert C. Ames

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cc: DCI
DDI



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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NIC 9076-82-
9 November 1982

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Iranian Policy

1. The long promised policy review of Iran, which is the backdrop for any renewed political action mandate, is to be accomplished through the vehicle of the overall NESA policy statement NSSD-4. Production of this document, long stalled by recent area crises, is scheduled to again commence on 12 November. Precedent indicates it will be a long process.

2. In the meanwhile, there are a number of indications that Soviet-Iranian official relations are deteriorating over time. Although no specific actions are currently identifiable which would hasten this trend, you may wish to mention it in your discussions with key officials. Specifically:

- Overt analysis reflects this trend. From the Shah's fall in January 1979 until early 1982 Soviet analysts of the Iranian scene emphasized the "positive" developments in Tehran and clearly sympathized with the Islamic revolution. Since mid-1982, however, the Soviet line has become much less sympathetic. A July 1982 Kommunist article, for example, contained unprecedented criticisms of the Khomeini regime and made little effort to balance negative comments with positive elements. In September, the Soviets turned down visa applications for an Iranian wrestling team.
- On the Afghan border, there have been a number of small incidents involving Afghan/Soviet "hot pursuit" incursions into Iranian territory. These have been reported by the Iranian border site back to Tehran. In one case, a Soviet soldier was captured and later repatriated.
- There is at least one unconfirmed indication that the Iranians may be commencing larger training activities of Afghan Mujahidin.

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- When we have picked up Soviet comments, they indicate a mistrust of the long-term tendencies of the ruling regime.

3. The downturn apparently reflects Moscow's realization that the clerical regime in Tehran is consolidating its grip on power, cracking down on the Tudeh Party and is determined to export the revolution to Afghanistan as well as Iraq and the Gulf states.

- Iran's invasion of Iraq last summer may have surprised Soviet analysts by underscoring Khomeini's willingness to use force to help Islamic revolutionaries outside Iran.

The deterioration probably also reflects Khomeini's firm rebuffs of several Soviet overtures last spring.

A cooling of Soviet-Iranian ties does not presage any opening for the US with Khomeini but it does reduce the danger somewhat of Soviet-Iranian collusion against US interests in the Persian Gulf.

- In a speech on the third anniversary of the hostage takeover last week Khomeini blasted the US for causing most world conflicts, especially the Iran-Iraq war.
- Economic ties have not been damaged, a sign that neither side wants the deterioration to go too far.

4. If the downward trend in Soviet-Iranian relations proves valid over time, it has obvious implications for our political action planning in Iran. It would, specifically, tend to support the State Department thesis that our best course is to allow time to take its course, and not engage in the types of activities which would slow this evolutionary process.

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Charles E. Waterman

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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NIC/NIO/NESA:CEWaterman

9 Nov. 82

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